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THE OHIO RULES OF EVIDENCE 
PARTV 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve University 
This is the last in a series of articles examining 
the Rules of Evidence as they apply in criminal 
cases. This article discusses some of the hearsay 
exceptions that are recognized by the Rules. These 
exceptions must be applied in light of the Confron-
tation Clause cases; See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 US 
56 (1980); State v. Tims, 9 OS(2d) 136, 224 NE(2d) 
348 (1967). 
RULE 803: HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS 
Rule 803 specifies twenty-two hearsay excep-
tions. Rule 804 specifies five hearsay exceptions. 
In contrast to the exceptions enumerated in Rule 
804, the Rule 803 exceptions do not depend on the 
unavailability of the declarant. Rules 803 and 804 
must be read in conjunction with Rule 801, which 
defines hearsay, and Rule 802, which excludes 
hearsay evidence in the absence of an exception. 
See also Rule 805 (admissibility of multiple hear-
say); Rule 806 (impeachment and rehabilitation of 
hearsay declarants). 
Firsthand Knowledge 
Several of the exceptions recognized in the 
Rules specifically require firsthand knowledge on 
,--the part of the declarant. E.g., Rule 803(5) & (6). For 
other exceptions, firsthand knowledge is not ex-
plicitly required. Nevertheless, firsthand knowledge 
is a requirement for all exceptions. This has been 
the traditional view. See 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence 
§ 1424 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). The Advisory Com-
mittee's Note to Federal Rule 803 reads: "1.'1 a 
hearsay situation, the declarant is, of cOlfrse, a 
witness, and neither this rule nor Rule 804 dis-
-Penses with the requirement of firsthand knowl-
edge. It may appear from his statement or be 
inferable from circumstances. See rule 602." 
RULE 803(1): PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSIONS 
Rule 803(1) recognizes a hearsay exception for 
present sense impressions. The rule requires: (1) a 
statement describing or explaining an event or 
condition, (2) about which the declarant had first-
hand knowledge, (3) made at the time the declar-
ant was perceiving the event or immediately there-
after, (4) under circumstances that do not indicate 
a lack of trustworthiness.The present sense im-
pression exception was not recognized under prior 
Ohio law, although statements that fall within this 
exception may have been admitted as res gestae. 
The reliability of present sense impressions 
rests upon the declarant's lack of time to fabricate. 
In the leading case, Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 
139 Tex 1, 161 SW(2d) 474 (1942), the court held 
that the statement was "sufficiently spontaneous 
to save it from the suspicion of being manufac-
tured evidence. There was no time for a calculated 
statement." /d. at 6. The Advisory Committee's 
Note to Federal Rule 803 states: "The underlying 
theory of Exception (1) is that substantial con-
temporaneity of event and statement negative the 
likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresen-
tation." In addition, the time requirement-''sub-
stantial contemporaneity"-eliminates any prob-
lem associated with defects in the declarant's 
ability to remember the event. 
This theory of admissibility differs from the 
theory which underlies the excited utterance ex-
ception recognized in Rule 803(2). The reliability of 
excited utterances is based upon the declarant's 
lack of capacity to fabricate. This difference in 
theory explains the differences between there-
quirements for application of the two exceptions. 
For example, a startling or exciting event is 
required for the excited utterance exception, but 
not for present sense impression exception. 
Time Requirement 
The rule requires that the statement be made 
"while the declarant was perceiving the event or 
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condition or immediately thereafter." The state-
ment mu~t be nearly contemporaneous with the 
perception of the event. This requirement is ll}Ore 
demanding than the time requirement for exc1ted 
utterances. An excited utterance could be made 
minutes (possibly longer) after the exciting event, 
so long as the declarant is under the influence of 
the exciting event at the time the statement is 
made. 
Subject Matter Requirement 
The rule requires that the statement describe or 
explain an event or condition. This requirement 
follows from the theory underlying the excep-
tion-lack of time to fabricate. Statements beyond 
descriptions or explanations indicate that the 
declarant has had sufficient time to think about 
the event. In contrast, the subject matter of an 
excited utterance is not so circumscribed-state-
ments "relating to a startling event" are ad-
missible. The Advisory Committee's Note to 
Federal Rule 803 states: "Permissible subject 
matter of the. statement is limited under Exception 
(1) to description or explanation of the event or 
condition, the assumption being that spontaneity, 
in the absence of a startling event, may extend no 
farther. In Exception (2) [excited utterances], 
however, the statement need only 'relate' to the 
startling event or condition, thus affording a 
broader scope of subject matter coverage." 
Circumstances of Lack of Trustworthiness 
In contrast to Federal Rule 803(1), the Ohio rule 
explicitly permits the exclusion of a statement that 
would otherwise qualify as a present sense im-
pression if the "circumstances indicate a lack of 
trustworthiness." One of the guarantees of trust-
worthiness upon which the present sense impres-
sion exception is based is verification. For 
example, McCormick states that "the statement 
will usually have been made to a third party (the 
person who subsequently testifies to it) who, ~eing 
present at the time and scene of the observation, 
will usually have an opportunity to observe the 
situation himself and thus provide a check on 
the accuracy of the declarant's statement." C. 
McCormick, Evidence 710 (2d ed. 1972). But if the 
witness (the third party) heard the statement but 
did not perceive the event, this safeguard is not 
present. The "lack of trustworthiness" clause was 
intended to protect against this possibility. The 
Staff Note contains the following commentary: 
One of the principal elements of the circumstantial 
guaranty of trustworthiness of this exception is that 
the statement was made at a time and under circum-
stances in which the person to whom the statement 
was made would be in a position to verify the state-
ment. The provision requiring exclusion if the circum-
stances donot warrant a high degree of trustworthi-
ness would justify exclusion if, for example, the 
statement were made by a declarant concerning a per-
ceived event to another by way of a G.B. radio trans-
mission. Other circumstances other than the lack of 
verification may also taint the trustworthiness of this 
class of hearsay declaration. 
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Startling Event Requirement 
The rule requires that the statement relate to a 
"startling event or condition." This requirement 
follows from the theory underlying the excep-
tion-without a startling event, the declarant's 
capacity to reflect and fabricate will not be sus- '~ 
pended. In State v. Duncan, 53 OS(2d) 215, 373 
NE(2d) 1234 (1978), the Supreme Court stated the 
requirement as follows: "[T]here [must be] some 
occurrence startling enough to produce a nervous 
excitement in thedeclarant, which was sufficient 
to still his reflective faculties and thereby make 
his statements and declarations the unreflective 
and sincere expression of his actual impressions 
and beliefs ... " /d. (syllabus, para. 1). 
The declarant may be a participant in the 
event-for example the victim of an assault or 
rape. The declarant also may be a bystander. 
Advisory Committee's Note; Fed. R. Evid. 803 
("Participation by the declarant is not required."). 
If the bystander-declarant is unidentified, admis-
sibility of the statement requires close scrutiny. 
The federal drafters recognized this problem. 
"[W]hen declarant is an unidentified bystander, the 
cases indicate hesitancy in upholding the state-
ment alone as sufficient, ... a result which would 
under appropriate circumstances be consistent 
with the rule." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. 
Evid. 803. See also New York, C. & St. L. R.R. v. 
Kovatch, 120 OS 532, 166 NE 682 (1929) (unidenti-
fied bystander's statement admitted). 
Proof of the startling event may consist of ex-
trinsic evidence of the event, including the condi- , 
tion of the declarant. In addition, the utterance 
itself may establish the existance of a startling 
event. See C. McCormick, Evidence 705 (2d ed. 
1972). 
Stress of Excitement Requirement 
The rule requires that the statement have been 
made "while the declarant was under the stress of 
excitement caused by the event or condition." This 
requirement follows from the theory underlying the 
exception; unless the declarant is speaking while 
under the influence of the event, his capacity to 
reflect and fabricate will not be suspended. In 
State v. Duncan, 53 OS(2d) 215, 373 NE(2d) 1234 
(1978), the Supreme Court stated the re~uirement. 
as follows: "[T]he statement or declaration, even 1f 
not strictly contemporaneous with the exciting 
cause, [must b~] made before there has been time 
for such a nervOus excitement to lose a domina-
tion over [the declarant's] reflective facilities, so 
that such domination continued to remain suffi-
cient to make his statements and declarations the 
unreflective and sincere expression of his actual 
impressions and beliefs ... " /d. (syllabus, para. 1). 
Hence, statements made after a substantial time 
has elapsed, may be admissible so long as the 
declarant is under the influence of the exciting 
event. C. McCormick, Evidence 706 (2d ed. 1972). 
The statement also may be made in response to a 
question. See State v. Duncan, supra; State v. 
Dickerson, 51 App(2d) 255, 367 NE(2d) 927 (1977). 
Subject Matter Requirement 
The rule requires that the statement "r.elate" to 
a startling event. See State v. Duncan, 53 OS(2d) 
215, 373 NE(2d) 1234 (1978) (syllabus, para. 1); 
Potter v. Baker, 162 OS 488, 124 NE(2d) 140 (1955). 
This requirement is simply a refinement of the 
"under the stress of the excitement" requirement 
discussed previously. Statements that do not "re-
late" to the startling event indicate that the 
declarant is no longer speaking while under the in-
fluence of the event. In Murphy Auto Parts Co. v. 
Ball, 249 F(2d) 508 (DC Cir 1957), cert. denied, 355 
US 932 (1958), the court explained: "[A)s soon as 
the excited utterance goes beyond description of 
the exciting event and deals with past facts or 
with the future it may tend to take on a reflective 
quality ... In other words, the very fact that the 
utterance is not descriptive of the exciting event is 
one of the factors which the trial court must take 
into account in the evaluation of whether the state-
ment is truly a spontaneous, impulsive expression 
excited by the event." /d. at 511. 
Other Requirements 
The firsthand knowledge rule applies to excited 
utterances. See State v. Duncan, 53 OS(2d} 215, 373 
N E(2d} 1234 (1978}; Potter v. Baker, 162 OS 488, 124 
N E(2d} 140 (1955). 
Rules relating to the competency of witnesses 
(see Rule 601) have not been applied to excited 
utterances. See C. McCormick, Evidence 708 (2d 
ed. 1972). Most of the Ohio cases have involved 
the statements of a young child. E.g., State v. 
Duncan, 53 OS(2d) 215, 373 N E(2d) 1234 (1978) (6 
year old child); State v. Lasecki, 90 OS 10, 106 NE 
660 (1914) (4 year old child). 
RULE 803(3): STATEMENTS OF 
PRESENTLY EXISTING STATE 
OF PHYSICAL CONDITION OR MIND 
Rule 803(3) recognizes a hearsay exception for 
statements of a declarant's "then existing state of 
mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition 
(such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental 
feeling, pain, and bodily health) ... " The rule explic-
itly excludes statements "of memory or belief to 
prove the fact remembered or believed unless it 
relates to the execution, revocation, identification, 
or terms of declarant's will." Many of the prior 
Ohio cases treated statements falling within this 
exception as part of the vague res gestae rule. 
For purposes of analysis, the rule can be divided 
into four categories: (1} statements of presently 
existing physical condition, (2) statements of pre-
3ently existing state of mind offered to prove that 
3tate of mind, (3) statements of presently existing 
3tate of mind offered to prove the declarant. acted 
n accordance with that state of mind, and (4) 
>tatements of memory or belief offered to prove 
he fact remembered or believed. Categories (2) 
tnd (3) are the more important ones in criminal 
:ases. 
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Statements of Presently Existing State of Mind 
Statements of presently existing state of mind 
or emotion, including statements of "intent, plan, 
motive, design, [or] mental feeling,' are admissible 
under Rule 803(3). A person's state of mind is often 
a consequential or material fact under the sub-
stantive law; for example, most crimes require 
proof of the defendant's mental state (mens rea). 
The reliability of statements of presently existing 
state of mind rests on the spontaneity of the state-
ment, which reduces the risk of conscious fabrica-
tion. See C. McCormick, Evidence 695 (2d ed. 
1972). 
Frequently, statements regarding the mental 
state of the declarant are not hearsay because 
they are not offered to prove the truth of the asser-
tion contained in the statement. For example, an 
accused's statement, "I will kill John Doe," offered 
to prove intent in a homicide prosecution, is hear-
say but falls within the exception of Rule 803(3). 
The statement, "John Doe is the most despicable 
person I know," offered to prove intent, is not 
offered to prove the truth of the assertion, and is, 
therefore, not hearsay. See C. McCormick, 
Evidence 694 (2d ed. 1972). 
Statements of State of Mind Offered to Prove 
Future Conduct 
Statements of presently existing state of mind 
are admissible under Rule 803(3) to prove that the 
declarant subsequently acted in accordance with 
that state of mind. For example, the accused's 
statement, "I will kill John Doe," is admissible to 
prove that the accused killed Doe as well as to 
prove his intent to kill. The leading case is Mutual 
Life Ins. Co. v. Hillman, 145 US 285 (1892), where 
letters in which the declarant stated that he in-
tended to travel from Wichita to Crooked Creek 
with another person (Hillman) were offered in evi-
dence. The U.S. Supreme Court held the letters ad-
missible: "The letters ... were competent not as 
narrative of facts communicated to the writer by 
others, nor yet as proof that he actually went away 
from Wichita, but as evidence that, shortly before 
the time when other evidence tended to show that 
he went away, he had the intention of going, and 
of going with Hillman, which made it more proba-
ble both that he did go and that he went with 
Hillman than if there had been no proof of such 
intention." /d. at 295-96. 
A major problem with this rule involves state-
ments offered to prove that a person other than 
the declarant also engaged in the intended con-
duct-for example, statements of a homicide vic-
tim that the victim intended to meet the accused 
on the day of the murder. The House Judiciary 
Committee Report attempted to limit the rule in 
this respect: "[T)he Committee intends that the 
Rule be construed to limit the doctrine of Mutual 
Life Insurance Co. v. Hillman ... so as to render 
statements of intent by a declarant admissible 
only to prove his future conduct, not the future 
conduct of another person." H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d 
Gong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in, [1974] U.S. 
ll: 
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Code Gong. & Ad. News 7075, 7087. See also 
United States v. Jenkins, 579 F(2d) 840 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 439 US 967 (1978). 
RULE 803(5): RECORDED RECOLLECTION 
Rule 803(5) recognizes a hearsay exception for 
past recollection recorded. See Annot., 35 A.L.R. 
Fed. 605 (1977). The rule requires that: (1) the wit-
ness have had firsthand knowledge of a matter; (2) 
the witness made or adopted a memorandum or re-
cord concerning the matter "when the matter was 
fresh in his memory"; (3) the memorandum or re-
cord reflects the witness' "knowledge correctly"; 
and (4) the witness has "insufficient recollection to 
enable him to testify fully and accurately" about 
the matter recorded. The exception for past recol-
lection recorded should be distinguished from the 
practice of refreshing recollection, which does not 
involve hearsay evidence and is governed by Rule 
612. 
The trustworthiness of records of past recollec-
tion "is found in the reliabilty inherent in a record 
made while events were still fresh in mind and 
accurately reflecting them." Advisory Committee's 
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803. The rule is consistent with 
prior Ohio cases. See State v. Scott, 31 OS(2d) 1, 
285 NE(2d) 344 (1972); Moots v. State, 21 OS 653 
(1871 ). 
Preparation of the Record 
The rule requires the record or memorandum "to 
have been made or adopted [by the witness] when 
the matter was fresh in his memory and to reflect 
[his] knowledge correctly." These requirements 
relating to the preparation of the record are de-
signed to ensure the reliability of the matters 
contained in the record. 
In State v. Scott, 31 OS(2d) 1, 285 N E(2d) 344 
(1972), the Supreme Court held that the record had 
to have been made "at or near the time of the 
event." ld. (syllabus, para. 1). In contrast, the rule 
requires that the record have been prepared "when 
the matter was fresh in [the witness'] memory." 
This formulation follows Wigmore's view. See 3 J. 
Wigmore, Evidence§ 745 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). 
The rule provides that the record may be either 
prepared or adopted by the witness so long as the 
witness vouches that the record reflects his 
"knowledge correctly." If the witness makes a 
statement to a third person who prepares a record, 
the record is admissible if the witness verified the 
accuracy of the record at a time when the event 
was fresh in his memory. Even if the witness did 
not verify the record, the record may be admissible 
if the recorder testifies that the record contains an 
accurate account of the witness' statement. This 
situation involves what McCormick refers to as 
"cooperative records." C. McCormick Evidence 716 
(2d ed. 1972) (citing Rathbun v. Brancatella, 93 
N.J.L. 222, 107 A.279 (1919). 
Rule 803(5) differs from its federal counterpart in 
one respect. The Ohio rule requires that the accu-
racy of the record be established "by the testi-
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mony of the witness," a requirement not explicitly 
stated in the federal rule. This amendment was 
intended to avoid the suggestion in United States 
v. Payne, 492 F(2d) 449 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 
US 876 (197 4), that the accuracy of the record 
could be established through the testimony of a 
third person, even though the witness could not 
recall making the statement recorded. 
Insufficient Recollection 
The rule requires that the witness have "insuffi-
cient recollection" of the matter contained in the 
record to enable him to testify "fully and accurate-
ly" at trial. This requirement is consistent with 
State v. Scott, 31 OS(2d) 1, 285 N E(2d) 344 (1972), in 
which the Supreme Court required that the witness 
"lack []a complete present recollection of the 
event. .. " ld. (syllabus, para. 1). 
The "insufficient recollection" requirement does 
not relate to the accuracy of the record or memo-
randum. Rather, it is aimed at avoiding abuse of 
the exception. "[T]he absence of the requirement, 
it is believed, would encourage the use of state-
ments carefully prepared for purposes of litigation 
under the supervision of attorneys, investigators, 
or claim adjustors." Advisory Committee's Note, 
Fed. R. Evid. 803. See also C. McCormick, 
Evidence § 302 (2d ed. 1972). 
RULE 803(6): BUSINESS RECORDS 
Rule 803(6) recognizes a hearsay exception for 
records of regularly conducted business activities. 
According to the Staff Note, the rule is "in sub-
stantial conformity with RC 2317.40, the Uniform 
Business Records as Evidence Act ... " 
Rule 803(6) requires: (1) a record of an act, event, 
or condition; (2) made at or near the time; (3) by, or 
from information transmitted by, a person with 
knowledge; (4) if the record was kept in the course 
of a regularly conducted business activity; (5) if it 
was the regular practice of that business activity 
to make the record; (6) as shown by the testimony 
of the custodian or other qualified witness or as 
provided by Rule 901(8)(10); (7) unless the source 
of information or the method or circumstances of 
preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness. 
Records of regularly conducted business activities 
include memoranda, reports, records, or "data 
compilation[s], in any form ... " "The expression 
'data compilation' is used as broadly descriptive of 
any means of storing information other than the 
conventional words and figures in written or docu-
mentary form. It includes, but is by no means 
limited to, electronic computer storage." Advisory 
Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803. 
The reliability of business records "is said vari-
ously to be supplied by systematic checking, by 
regularity and continuity which produce habits of 
precision, by actual experience of business in 
relying upon them, or by a duty to make an 
accurate record as part of a continuing job or 
occupation." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. 
Evid. 803. See also Weis v. Weis, 147 OS 416, 72 
NE(2d) 245 (1947). 
The rule requires that the record be "kept in the 
course of a regularly conducted business activity." 
The rule defines a business as an "institution, 
association, profession, occupation, and calling of 
' every kind, whether or not conducted for profit." 
The term business was defined broadly in the rule 
to include "the records of institutions and associa-
tions like schools, churches and hospitals ... " H.R. 
Rep. No. 1597, 93rd Gong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 
[1974] U.S. Code Gong. & Ad News 7098, 7104 (Con-
ference Report). Personal records are not admissi-
ble under this exception. 
The rule also requires that the record be the 
product of "the regular practice of that business 
activity." See RC 2317.40 (record made "in the reg-
ular course of business"); Kalna v. Fialko, 102 App 
442, 446, 125 NE(2d) 565, 567 (1955) ("piece of 
paper was not a part of any system of the plaintiff 
in recording events of his business."). 
Time Requirement 
The rule requires that the record have been 
"made at or near the time" of the act, event, or 
condition. RC 2317.40 contains an identical provi-
sion. The time requirement is one of the conditions 
that ensures the reliability of business records. 
McCormick advocated a flexible approach in apply-
ing this requirement: "Whether an entry made sub-
sequent to the transaction has been made within a 
sufficient time to render it within the exception 
depends upon whether the time span between the 
transaction and the entry was so great as to sug-
gest a danger of inaccuracy by lapse of memory." 
C. McCormick, Evidence 724 (2d ed. 1972). See also 
5 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 1526 (Chadbourn rev. 
1974). 
Firsthand Knowledge; Double Hearsay 
The rule provides that the record must have 
been made by a person with knowledge of the act, 
event, or condition or from information transmitted 
by a person with such knowledge. This provision 
does not require that the "person with knowledge" 
be produced or identified. 
The firsthand knowledge requirement presents 
no problem when the person making the record 
had personal knowledge of the act, event, or condi-
tion. The difficult cases involve records in which 
the supplier of information does not make the 
record, but transmits the information to another 
person who makes the record. If both the supplier 
and recorder are acting in the regular course of 
business the record is admissible; the supplier is 
under a duty to transmit the information and the 
recorder is under a duty to make the record. The 
recorder need not have firsthand knowledge of the 
event. See C. McCormick, Evidence 726 (2d ed. 
1972). 
The situation is different if the supplier is not 
under a duty to transmit the information. 
If ... the supplier of the information does not act in the 
regular course, an essential link is broken; the assur-
ance of accuracy does not extend to the information 
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itself, and the fact that it may be recorded with scru-
pulous accuracy is of no avail. An illustration is the 
police report incorporating information obtained from 
a bystander: the officer qualifies as acting in the 
regular course but the informant does not. The 
leading case, Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 
517 (1930), held that a report thus prepared was inad-
missible .... The rule follows this lead in requiring an 
informant with knowledge acting in the course of the 
regularly conducted activity." Advisory Committee's 
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803. 
If the supplier is not under a duty to transmit the 
information, the record may nevertheless be ad-
missible, but only if the supplier's statement falls 
within another hearsay exception. This situation 
presents a double hearsay problem and admissibil-
ity is governed by Rule 805. For example, if the 
statement by the supplier is made for the purpose 
of medical diagnosis or treatment, the statement 
may qualify under Rule 803(4). If the supplier is not 
acting pursuant to a business duty and his state-
ment does not fit into another exception, the state-
ment is inadmissible. See Schmitt v. Doehler Die 
Casting Co., 143 OS 421,"44 NE(2d) 644 (1944); 
Hytha v. Schwendeman, 40 App(2d) 478, 484, 320 
NE(2d) 312, 317 (1974) ("'hearsay on hearsay,' in 
the absence of other exceptions to the general 
hearsay rule, is not admissible, even in view of the 
business records as evidence statute."). 
Method of Proof 
The rule provides that the foundation for the ad-
missibility of business records may be "shown by 
the testimony of the custodian or other qualified 
witness or as provided by Rule 901(8)(10) ... " The 
reference to Rule 901(8)(1)(10), which governs 
methods of authentication, does not appear in the 
federal rule. According to the Staff Note, "[t]his 
language was added to clearly permit the admis-
sion of records which qualify as self-authentica-
ting pursuant to statute such as hospital records 
under RC 2317.422." 
Lack of Trustworthiness 
A record that satisfies the requirements of Rule 
803(6) may nevertheless be excluded if "the source 
of information or the method or circumstances of 
preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness." The 
leading case is Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 US 109 
(1943), in which the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted 
the federal business records statute as excluding 
an accident report prepared by an employee of the 
defendant-railroad company. The report was ex-
cluded not because it was untrustworthy, but 
rather because it was not made "in the regular 
course of business." According to the Court, the 
primary use of the report was "in litigating, not in 
railroading." /d. at 113-14. Palmer v. Hoffman has 
been criticized, see C. McCormick, Evidence 723 
(2d ed. 1972), and the federal drafters decided to 
deal explicitly with the problem of unreliable 
records by including the "lack of trustworthiness" 
requirement. 
RC 2317.40 contains a similar provision-admis-
sion of the record is proper "if, in the opinion of 
the court, the sources of information, method, and 
time of preparation were such as to justify [the 
record's] admission." In addition, the courts have 
recognized that "if it should appear that such 
records have been made and kept solely for a self-
serving purpose of the party offering them in 
evidence, it would be the duty of a trial court to 
refuse to admit them." Weis v. Weis, 147 OS 416, 
426, 72 NE(2d) 245, 251 (1947). 
RULE 803(8): PUBLIC RECORDS 
Rule 803(8) recognizes a hearsay exception for 
public records and reports. Authentication of 
public records is governed by Rules 901(B)(7), (10), 
and 902. Under Rule 902 many public records are 
self-authenticating and thus admissible without 
any need to produce an authenticating witness. If 
a public record contains a statement which is 
itself hearsay, admissibility is governed by Rule 
805 (multiple hearsay). See also Westinghouse 
Elec. v. Dolly Madison Leasing & Furniture Corp, 42 
OS(2d) 122, 326 NE(2d) 651 (1975). 
Rule 803(8) provides that records of a public 
office or agency setting forth "(a) the activities of 
the office or agency, or (b) matters observed pursu-
ant to duty imposed by law as to which there was 
a duty to report" are admissible. There are two 
limitations. In criminal cases, records containing 
matters observed by police officers and other law 
enforcement personnel are inadmissible if offered 
by the prosecution. Moreover, if the "sources of 
information or other circumstances indicate lack 
of trustworthiness" the record is inadmissible. 
Federal Rule 803(8) contains an additional subdivi-
sion which provides: "(c) in civil actions and pro-
ceedings and against the Government in criminal 
cases, factual findings resulting from an investiga-
tion made pursuant to authority granted by law" 
are admissible. This provision was not adopted. 
Consequently, evaluative reports are not admissi-
ble under Ohio Rule 803(8). Although subdivision 
(a) does not explicitly contain a firsthand knowl-
edge requirement, that requirement is applicable. 
The rule is similar to RC 2317.42, which pro-
vides: "Official reports made by officers of this 
state, or certified copies of the same, on a matter 
within the scope of their duty as defined by stat-
ute, shall, insofar as relevant, be admitted as evi-
dence of the matters stated therein." There are 
several differences between the rule and statute. 
The statute uses the term "official reports," where-
as the rule uses the phrase "[r]ecords, reports, 
statements, or data compilations, in any form." 
The term "data compilation" refers to computer-
generated records. In addition, the statute covers 
only official reports "made by officers of this 
state." See State v. Colvin, 19 OS(2d) 86, 249 
NE(2d) 784 (1969); Masseo v. Board of Liquor 
Control, 73 Abs 94, 136 NE(2d) 663 (App 1955). In 
contrast, the rule refers to records of "public 
officers and agencies." This language is intended 
to encompass the records of federal agencies as 
well as the records of agencies of other states. 
See Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803 
("The rule makes no distinction between federal 
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and nonfederal offices and agencies.") The statute 
also permits the use of "certified copies." Al-
though Rule 803(8) does not address this issue, 
Rule 1005 permits the use of certified copies of 
public records. 
Records of Activities of the Office or Agency 
Rule 803(8)(a) provides for the admission of 
records setting forth the "activities of the office 
or agency." The Advisory Committe.e's Note to 
Federal Rule 803 contains the following examples: 
"Cases illustrating the admissibility of records of 
the office's or agency's own activities are numer-
ous. Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co. v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 123, 39 S. Ct. 407, 63 L.Ed. 889 
(1919), Treasury records of miscellaneous receipts 
and disbursements; Howard v. Perrin, 200 U.S. 71, 
26 S. Ct. 195, 50 L.Ed. 374 (1906), General Land 
Office records; Ballew v. United States, 160 U.S. 
187, 16 S. Ct. 263, 40 L.Ed. 388 (1895), Pension 
Office records." The Ohio cases include: State v. 
Walker, 53 OS(2d) 192, 374 NE(2d) 132 (1978) 
(record of proper calibration of breath analysis 
machine admitted); State v. Smith, 55 App(2d) 202, 
380 NE(2d) 353 (1977) (record of notice of suspen-
sion of driver's license admitted). 
Matters Observed Pursuant to 
Duty Imposed by Law 
Rule 803(8)(b) provides for the admission of 
records setting forth "matters observed pursuant 
to duty imposed by law as to which matters there 
was a duty to report, excluding, however, in crimi-
nal cases matters observed by police officers and 
other law enforcement personnel, unless offered 
by defendant." The Advisory Committee's Note to 
Federal Rule 803 contains the following examples: 
Cases sustaining admissibility of records of matters 
observed are also numerous. United States v. Van 
Hook, 284 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1960), remanded for resen-
tencing, 365 U.S. 609, 81 S. Ct. 823, 5 L.Ed. 821, letter 
from induction officer to District Attorney, pursuant to 
army regulations, stating fact and circumstances of 
refusal to be inducted; T'Kach v. United States, 242 
F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1857), affidavit of White House per-
sonnel officer that search of records showed no em-
ployment of accused, charged with fraudulently repre-
senting himself as an envoy of the President; 
Minnehaha County v Kelley, 150 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 
1945); Weather Bureau records of rainfall; United 
States v. Meyer, 113 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. 
denied, 311 U.S. 706, 61 S. Ct. 174, 85 L.Ed. 459, map 
prepared by government engineer from information 
furnished by men working under his supervision. 
The Ohio cases include: Westinghouse Elec. v. 
Dolly Madison Leasing & Furniture Corp, 42 OS(2d) 
122, 326 N E(2d) 651 (1975) (fire department report 
admissible but statements of third persons con-
tained in report inadmissible); Carson v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., 156 OS 104, 100 NE(2d) 197 (1951) 
(coroner's report admissible but opinion as to 
suicide inadmissible). 
The exclusion of police reports in criminal cases 
is based on the concern that admissibility of these 
reports would impinge upon an accused's right of 
confrontation. In contrast to the federal rule, Rule 
803(8)(b) includes the phrase "unless offered by 
defendant." According to the Staff Note, "[s]uch 
exculpatory reports should be available to the de-
fendant since none of the constitutional hazards of 
confrontation are involved in making such reports 
admissible on behalf of defendants." See also 
United States v. Smith, 521 F(2d) 957 (DC Cir. 1975). 
If a record is excluded because it involves a matter 
observed by police officers or other law enforce-
ment personnel, the question remains whether the 
record may be admitted under the business rec-
ords exception, Rule 803(6). In United States v. 
Oates, 560 F(2d) 45 (2d Cir. 1977), the court an-
swered the question in the negative. Other courts, 
however, have reached the opposite result. See 4 
D. Louise! & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence 770-76 
(1980); 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's 
Evidence , 803(8)[04] (1979). 
RULE 803(21): JUDGMENT 
OF PREVIOUS CONVICTION 
Rule 803(21) recognizes a hearsay exception for 
judgments of previous criminal convictions when 
offered "to prove any fact essential to sustain the 
judgment." The rule contains an expr_ess limit~tion 
to admissibility of evidence of a prevrous convrc-
tion offered by the prosecution in a criminal case; 
judgments "against persons other than the ac-
cused" are not admissible except for the purpose 
of impeachment. As explained by the federal 
drafters, this limitation is based on constitutional 
concerns: 
[1]he exception does not include evidence of the con-
viction of a third person, offered against the accused 
in a criminal prosecution to prove any fact essential 
to sustain the judgment of conviction. A contrary 
position would seem clearly to violate the right of con-
frontation. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 19 S. Ct. 
574, 43 L. Ed. 890 (1899), error to convict of posses-
sing stolen postage stamps with the only evidence of 
theft being the record of conviction of the thieves. The 
situation is to be distinguished from cases in which 
conviction of another person is an element of. the 
crime, e.g. 15 U.S.C. § 902(d), interstate shipment ?~ 
firearms to a known convicted felon, and, as specrfr-
cally provided, from impeachment. Advisory Commit-
tee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803. 
rhis limitation does not preclude an accused from 
ntroducing judgments against third persons. 
RULE 804(A): UNAVAILABILITY 
Rule 804(A) contains five conditions of unavaila-
>ility. A witness is unavailable where the witness 
1) claims a valid privilege; (2) refuses to testify 
lespite a court order to do so; (3) lacks a present 
nemory of the subject matter; (4) is dead or infirm; 
1r (5) is absent from the hearing and his testimony 
annot be procured by process or other reasonable 
1eans. Rule 804(A) must be read in light of the 
:onfrontation Clause cases. In Barber v. Page, 390 
I.S. 719 (1968), the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
1e unavailability requirement is satisfied only if 
the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-
lith effort to obtain" the presence of the declar-
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ant at trial. /d. at 725. See also Ohio v. Roberts, 
448 u.s. 56 (1980). 
By adopting a uniform rule of unavailability that 
applies to all the exceptions recognized in subdi-
vision (B), the rule differs from the common law, 
under which each exception had developed its own 
conditions of unavailability. For example, the 
common law unavailability requirements for former 
testimony, dying declarations, and declarations 
against interest were not identical. 
It is the unavailability of the declarant's 
testimony, rather than the unavailability of the 
declarant, that is determinative. Thus, if the de-
clarant is present in court but claims a valid 
privilege, refuses to testify, or suffers a lack of 
memory, his testimony is unavailable and the hear-
say statements falling within the enumerated ex-
ceptions of subdivision (B) are admissible. The 
burden of establishing unavailability rests on the 
party offering the evidence. See State v. Smith, 58 
OS(2d) 344, 390 NE(2d) 778 (1979), vacated on other 
grounds, 100 S. Ct. 3041 (1980); New York Central 
R.R. v. Stevens, 126 OS 395, 185 NE 542 (1933). 
RULE 804(8)(1): FORMER TESTIMONY 
Rule 804(B)(1) recognizes a hearsay exception for 
former testimony. The rule provides for admissibili-
ty (1) of the testimony of a witness at an?ther 
hearing or deposition; (2) if the party agamst whom 
the testimony is offered had an opportunity and 
similar motive to develop the testimony of the wit-
ness by direct, cross, or redirect examination; and 
(3) the witness is unavailable, Rule 804(A). The for-
mer testimony of a party is admissible against that 
party as an admission of a party-opponent. See 
Rule 801(D)(2)(a). Rule 804 (B)(1) supersedes 
RC2945.49. 
Type of Testimony 
The rule provides for the admissibility of testi-
mony given "at another hearing of the same or a 
different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in 
compliance with law in the course of the same or 
another proceeding." As originally adopted, Rule 
804(B)(1) excluded preliminary hearing testimony 
from the former testimony exception. See 53 Ohio 
Bar 220 (1980). The exclusion of preliminary 
hearing testimony, Grim. R. 5(B), was based upon 
the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State v. 
Roberts, 55 OS(2d) 191, 378 NE(2d) 492 (1978). The 
Court in Roberts held that admitting preliminary 
hearing testimony in a criminal trial violated the 
accused's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. 
Several days before the Rules of Evidence became 
effective, the Roberts decision was reversed by the 
U.S. Supreme Court. Ohio v. Roberts 448 U.S. 56 
(1980). In response, the rule was amended by de-
leting the clause which exempted preliminary 
hearing testimony. See 54 Ohio Bar 175-76 (1981). 
The deletion of this clause means that preliminary 
hearing testimony is admissible under the former 
testimony exception. It should be noted, however, 
that admitting preliminary hearing testimony in a 
criminal trial still raises confrontation issues. 
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Although the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that admit-
ting the preliminary hearing testimony in Ohio v. 
Roberts was not error, the Court did not hold that 
the admission of preliminary hearing testimony 
will always be beyond constitutional attack. Hence 
the inclusion of preliminary hearing testimony 
within the former testimony exception changes the 
evidentiary, but not the constitutional, analysis. 
In addition to depositions and preliminary 
hearing testimony, former testimony includes testi-
mony given at a prior trial. See Sheets v. Hodges, 
142 OS 559, 53 NE(2d) 804 (1944); Summons v. 
State, 5 OS 325 (1856). It also includes testimony 
given at any proceeding at which a witness testi-
fies under oath. 
Similar Motive to Examine 
The rule provides that former testimony is ad-
missible only "if the party against whom the testi-
mony is now offered ... had an opportunity and 
similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, 
cross, or redirect examination." The rule does not 
require "identity of parties." See C. McCormick, 
Evidence § 256 (2d ed. 1972). As long as the party 
against whom the former testimony is offered had 
an opportunity to examine the witness at the for-
mer hearing, the rule is satisfied. It should be 
noted that the rule requires only that the "oppor-
tunity" to develop the testimony by direct, cross, 
or redirect E)Xamination have been provided at the 
former hearing. "Actual cross-examination, of 
course, is not essential, if the opportunity was 
afforded and waived." C. McCormick, Evidence 616 
(2d ed. 1972). See also 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 
1371 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). 
Method of Proof 
The rule does not specify acceptable methods of 
proving former testimony. RC 2945.49 contains the 
following provisions on the method of proof in 
criminal cases: "If such former testimony is con-
tained within a bill of exceptions, or authenticated 
transcript of such testimony, it shall be proven by 
the bill of exceptions, or transcript, otherwise by 
other testimony." 
A transcript of the former proceeding is the typi-
cal and preferable method of proof. See Rule 
803(8) (hearsay exception for public records). For-
mer testimony also may be proved by the testi-
mony of a witness who was present at the time the 
testimony was given. See Wagers v Dickey, 17 
Ohio 439 (1848). In Summons v. State, 5 OS 325 
(1856), the Supreme Court outlined the following 
requirements: 
It is essential to the competency of the witness called 
to give this kind of evidence, first, that he heard the 
deceased person testify on the former trial; and 
second, that he has such accurate recollection of the 
matter stated, that he will, on his oath, assume or 
undertake to narrate in substance, the matter sworn 
to by the deceased person, in all its material parts, or 
that part thereof which he may be called on to prove. 
/d. (syllabus). 
See C. McCormick, Evidence§ 260 (2d ed. 1972). 
The testimony of a witness should be used as a 
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method of proof only if a transcript is not availa-
ble. The court has the authority pursuant to Rule 
611(A) to require a transcript be used if one is 
available. 
RULE 804(8)(2): DYING DECLARATIONS 
Rule 804(8)(2) recognizes a hearsay exception for 
dying declarations. The rule requires that: (1) the 
statement be made while the declarant believed 
his death was imminent; (2) the statement concern 
the "cause or circumstances of what [the declar-
ant] believed to be his impending death"; (3) the 
declarant be unavailable, see Rule 804(A); and (4) 
the statement was based on the firsthand knowl-
edge of the declarant. See Advisory Committee's 
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 804 ("continuation of a require-
ment of firsthand knowledge is assured by Rule 
602"). 
The rule is identical to Federal Rule 804(b)(2) and 
changes prior to Ohio law. In contrast to the com-
mon law, admissibility is not conditioned on the 
declarant's death. Any of the conditions of un-
availability specified in Rule 804(A) is sufficient. 
Imminent Expectation of Death 
The rule provides that the statement must be 
"made by a declarant while believing that his 
death was imminent." This requirement follows 
from the theory underlying the exception; a declar-
ant who does not believe that death is near may 
not feel compelled to speak truthfully. In Shepard 
v. United States, 290 US 96 (1933), Justice Cardozo 
described this requirement in the following terms: 
To make out 
1
a dying declaration the declarant must 
have spoken without hope of recovery and in the 
shadow of impending death .... 
There must be 'a settled hopeless expectation' ... 
that death is near at hand, and what is said must 
have been so spoken in the hush of its impending 
presence .... What is decisive is the state of mind. 
Even so, the state of mind must be exhibited in the 
evidence, and not left to conjecture. The [declarant] 
must have spoken with the consciousness of a swift 
and certain doom. /d. at 99-100. 
See also State v. Kindle, 47 OS 358, 24 NE 485 
(1890) (statement of declarant "made in extremis, 
while conscious of his condition and under a 
sense of impending dissolution"). 
The declarant's belief of impending death may 
be established by the declarant's own statements. 
In addition, it may be established "circumstantially 
by the apparent fatal quality of the wound, by the 
statements made to the declarant by the doctor or 
by others that his condition is hopeless, and by 
other circumstances." C. McCormick, Evidence 681 
(2d ed. 1972). See a/so State v. Kotowicz, 55 App 
497, 9 NE(2d) 1003 (1937); Shinkman v. State, 7 Abs 
518 (App 1029). 
Nature of the Statement 
The rule limits the type of statements that are 
admissible under this exception to those "con-
cerning the cause and circumstances of what [the 
declarant] believed to be his impending death." 
Statements identifying the assailant who caused 
the injury are included, as are statements describ-
ing the events leading up to the injury. See C. 
McCormick, Evidence 682-83 (2d ed. 1972); 5 J. 
Wigmore, Evidence § 1434, at 282 (Chadbourn rev. 
1974) ("facts leading up to or causing or attending 
the injurious act."). 
RULE 804(8)(3): STATEMENTS AGAINST INTEREST 
Rule 804(8)(3) recognizes a hearsay exception for 
statements against interest. See Annat., 34 A.L.R. 
Fed. 412 (1977). Such statements are admissible if 
(1) they are based on firsthand knowledge, (2) they 
are against the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary 
interest or would subject him to criminal or civil 
liability or render invalid a claim by him against 
another at the time made, and (3) the declarant is 
unavailable, see Rule 804(A). Statements of parties 
are admissible as admissions of party-opponents 
under Rule 801 (0)(2). 
The declaration against interest exception 
has been the subject of constitutional attack. In 
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 US 284 (1973), the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that the exclusion of dec-
larations against penal interest offered by a crimi-
nal defendant for the purpose of exculpation was 
a violation of due process. See also Green v. 
Georgia, 442 US 95 (1979). It should be noted 
that the declarant in Chambers was not available. 
Thus, in criminal cases the applicability of Rule 
304(8)(3) is affected by constitutional consider-
:J.tions. See generally 4 D. louisell & C. Mueller, 
=ederal Evidence § 489 (1980). 
~orroboration Requirement 
The rule provides that a "statement tending to 
~xpose the declarant to criminal liability, whether 
>ffered to exculpate or inculpate the accused, is 
1ot admissible unless corroborating circum-
;tances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the 
;tatement." The use of the word "accused" indi-
:ates that the corroboration requirement was in-
ended to apply only in criminal cases. In contrast 
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to the Ohio rule, Federal Rule 804(b)(3) requires 
corroboration only when the statement is offered 
to exculpate the accused. The corroboration re-
quirement was explained by the federal drafters as 
follows: 
The refusal of the common law to concede the 
adequacy of a penal interest was no doubt indefens-
ible in logic, ... but one senses in the decisions a 
distrust of evidence of confessions by third persons 
offered to exculpate the accused arising from suspi-
cions of fabrication either of the fact of the making of 
the confession or in its contents, enhanced in either 
instance by the required unavailability of the declar-
ant. Nevertheless, an increasing amount of decisional 
law recognizes exposure to punishment for crime as a 
sufficient stake .... The requirement of corroboration is 
included. in the rule in order to effect an accommoda-
tion between these competing considerations .... The 
requirement of corroboration should be construed in 
such a manner as to effectuate its purpose of circum-
venting fabrication. Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. 
R. Evid. 804. 
The Ohio rule also requires corroboration of 
statements inculpating the accused-for example, 
a statement by an accomplice that he and the ac-
cused committed a crime. The corroboration re-
quirement was added because such statements 
are often self-serving and their admission raises 
confrontation issues. Although Federal Rule 804, 
as adopted, allows the introduction of statements 
inculpating the accused, the Advisory Committee's 
Note to the rule recognized that such statements 
may not always be reliable: "Whether a statement 
is in fact against interest must be determined from 
the circumstances of each case. Thus a statement 
admitting guilt and implicating another person, 
made while in custody, may well be motivated by a 
desire to curry favor with the authorities and hence 
fail to qualify as against interest. ... On the other 
hand, the same words spoken under different cir-
cumstances, e.g. to an acquaintance, would have 
no difficulty in qualifying. The rule does not 
purport to deal with questions of the right of 
confrontation." 
